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ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE 1990st
Nathan Glazerl
It is not easy to discuss the academic freedom situation in
general in the United States today. Approximately 3500
institutions warrant being considered "institutions of higher
education," but they fall into very different categories, from elite
private research universities to community colleges. The
situation is very different in, for example, selective liberal arts
colleges from what it is in urban community colleges, though
some common elements (concern over sexual harassment,
minority rights and sensitivities) are probably universal. Matters
differ in different fields: the culture of business schools, engi-
neering schools and physics departments is very different from
that in the humanities and social sciences. No recent major
studies exist that are equivalent to those carried out in the 1950s
and 1970s, previous periods of zealotry (to use Neil Hamilton's
useful phrase)' that permit us to make any estimates of the
problem of academic freedom and how it differs in various fields
and types of institutions. We might all agree that one useful
project that should be undertaken is a study of faculty and
pressures placed upon them, similar to those conducted in the
1950s by Lazarsfeld and Thielens' and in the 1970s by Ladd and
Lipset.s
In the absence of such a study, one is limited, generaliza-
tions are difficult to make-though we all make them-and one
tends to concentrate on the institution one knows best, hoping
that at least some of what goes on there is typical and gives some
sense of the state of academic freedom generally. I suspect
however that Harvard University, where I have been for more
than twenty-five years, is probably the worst place from which to
t This article is based on a speech given by Professor Glazer at the Academic
Freedom Symposium.
tt Nathan Glazer is a professor at Harvard University.
1. See gerally NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
2. PAUL LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC MIND (1958).
3. EVERETr C. LADD, JR. & SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, THE DIVIDED ACADEMY (1975).
1
et al.: Academic Freedom in the 1990s
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
W/LLL4M MITCF-ELL/AW REVEW
consider the distinctive issues that the zealotry of today raises for
academic freedom. While incidents at Harvard figure in the
canon of anecdotes and accounts4 relating to abuses of academ-
ic freedom today, the most egregious incidents have not taken
place there. Harvard's former President, Derek Bok, was no
cheerleader in the movement to subject speech by students and
faculty to academic discipline, as have been some other universi-
ty presidents. He thought the First Amendment, as interpreted
by the courts, was good enough for the purpose of defining the
bounds of allowable speech on campus, in the classroom, and in
society generally. He believed the First Amendment allows a
great deal more speech on campus than I would consider
proper. Bok also resisted the popular demand, which few other
university presidents did, that the university withdraw its
endowment's investments from companies doing business in
South Africa. As a result, he underwent the unpleasant experi-
ence of being surrounded, followed, and harassed by students
demanding that Harvard join the divestment bandwagon. His
successor, President Rudenstine, has had no problem, up to now,
resisting student demands for ethnic study programs. One hopes
that the examples of his strong-minded predecessors will be
followed, should more difficult issues arise.
Harvard students may be different in the strains they put on
administrators. They have not yet engaged-and probably will
not-in the unpleasant radical actions in support of their
demands, such as occupying the President's office, that have
been seen at other universities. I do not think Harvard's
students are any less inflamed by the issues of race, sex and
sexual orientation-pro or con-that sustain zealotry on other
campuses, but there may be a touch more support for civility.
If my views seem too complacent and if I consider the situation
regarding academic freedom in general to be better today than
it has ever been, you may, if you wish, ascribe it to my viewing
the situation from an institution in which the worst has not yet
happened-such as professors being investigated and losing their
jobs for alleged sexist or racist statements, or the student
newspaper being confiscated and its editors held under siege by
student militants because of supposed racism.
4. See, e.g., DINEsH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND
SEX ON CAMPUS, 194-229 (1991).
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Nevertheless, what I consider today's distinctive characteris-
tic bent in the issue of academic freedom in the nineties is
present at Harvard, and elsewhere. That distinctive bent is self-
censorship by the faculty on the key issues of race, gender and
sexual orientation in order to avoid controversy. Self-censorship,
a distinctive issue in academic freedom, is, of course, not a new
issue. In previous ages of academic zealotry, when the major
issue was religious unorthodoxy, support of socialism, criticism
of foreign policy or support of Communism, there was plenty of
self-censorship by faculty and perhaps by students. But in these
previous ages, self-censorship was resorted to in order to avoid
serious consequences, such as being dismissed by the trustees,
expelled by the administration, or attracting the attention of
state legislative and congressional investigating committees, with
the ultimate threat of possible imprisonment on grounds of
perjury and the like. These serious consequences were worth
avoiding. Today, I feel that self-censorship is invoked mainly for
convenience, because the penalties are much more modest:
perhaps some degree of social ostracism by one's colleagues
(and there are such cases), unfair treatment by colleagues and
administration, and in extreme situations, threat to jobs.
Today, when we deal with these controversial issues, the
faculty member often does not speak out when issues touch his
or her own field, where one has some duty to engage in
discussion. He also does not speak out on issues in unrelated or
distantly related fields, where the obligation to take a stand is
less, since one is not supposed to be an expert in these areas.
However, one's duties as a citizen of an academic community in
which these issues are being debated, should compel more
faculty members to be involved. Take, for example, the case of
Mary Lefkowitz, who spoke up to challenge the nonsensical
assertion in a public lecture at Wellesley College by a supposed
expert on ancient Egypt that Aristotle stole his ideas from the
library of Alexandria, which had not yet been established when
Aristotle authored his works. The alleged expert's point was that
black civilization, as he asserted Egypt was, had gotten there first.
Others could have joined Lefkowitz in speaking against such
fantasy but did not. Because the speaker was disputed by only
one faculty member, the students who took this visitor's non-
sense seriously were left to believe he had a point. An attempt
to establish truth was reduced to a contretemps between two
19961
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experts holding different positions.' Mary Lefkowitz could have
bit her tongue, then and later, when a colleague began to use
the scurrilous Nation of Islam text on the relations between Jews
and blacks throughout history. In so doing, one avoids entering
into controversy and dealing with matters that, one can say, are
beneath one's notice. This is the attraction of self-censorship.
Mary Lefkowitz undertook a difficult and demanding task and in
doing so contributed to the education of students at Wellesley.
In the past, it was those with the unorthodox positions,
whether in religion, politics, or international affairs, who did not
speak out, but censored themselves. Today, it is characteristically
those with more traditional positions who do not speak out.
This is the case, I believe, in major research universities, state
universities and colleges, leading liberal arts colleges, and urban
community colleges, which make up, by far, the largest part of
American higher education. Undoubtedly, one can still find
institutions, generally religiously affiliated or minor ones most
people have not heard of, where self-censorship is undertaken,
as it commonly was in the past, by the progressive, radical or
unorthodox faculty members who may fear institutional retribu-
tion. John K. Wilson has uncovered his own canon of outrages
by conservative institutions to put against those that D'Souza and
Bernstein have recorded.6 In conservative institutions, a few
exist today in higher education, one can well believe that radicals
and gay and lesbian faculty members may find it the better part
of wisdom to keep their views to themselves and their associa-
tions very private. But these institutions are few and hardly
visible. Even Catholic and Baptist institutions today are affected
by the dominant cultural trends-feminism, women's rights,
minority rights and sensitivities.
The few conservative institutions are not representative of
what is happening in academia generally. As David Riesman put
it a long time ago, academia can be compared to a boa constric-
tor swallowing a pig, in that matters long settled at the head of
the snake are still visible as issues long down toward the tail. In
the institutions that make up three-quarters or more of American
5. See MARY LEFKOWrTz, NOT OUT OF AFRICA (1995).
6. See JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYrH OF POLITICAL CORRECrNESS (1995). The
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higher education, I cannot imagine Marxist views (whatever they
may consist of in these latter days, when only North Korea and
Cuba survive as avowedly Marxist states), socialist views, anti-
religious views, or support of rights for gays and lesbians, by
anyone, faculty or students, being any kind of issue. It is rather
the opposite views-opposition to abortion based on religion, or
skepticism about the value of placing gays and lesbians under the
legal protection from discrimination we have enacted for
minorities and women, or indeed skepticism about the legal
measures that now protect minorities and women-that are likely
to be censored by faculty, whether in class or in public discus-
sion.
The issue has been very well analyzed by Glenn Loury.7 As
he puts it: "It is not the iron fist of repression but the velvet
glove of seduction that is the real problem."' Many of us do not
say what we believe or what we know to be true, not because we
are afraid of specific consequences that may harm us, but
because we are concerned about the good opinions of fellow-
academics, our students, or the surrounding community.
Clearly, what will affect those good opinions will vary from
institution to institution. But, as we know, the academy on the
whole is more liberal than the community as a whole. This
difference is evident when we compare faculty opinions with
those of Americans in general: more call themselves liberal,
fewer call themselves conservative. This distinctive academic
environment is even more marked in certain parts of higher
education-social scientists and humanists generally are more
liberal than engineering or business faculty, and elite universities
are more liberal than others. While there have been changes,
this overall pattern has remained constant since the major survey
of faculty conducted by Lipset and Ladd in the early 1970s, and
this greater liberalism is found when we look at specific issues,
such as affirmative action or presidential preferences.9
Desiring to stay in the good graces of one's community by
muting one's opinions and beliefs is not altogether a bad thing,
and pronouncing loudly on every subject, whatever offense one
gives to one's students or one's fellow faculty members, is not
7. See generaUy Glenn Loury, Sef-Censorship, 4 PARTISAN REv. 608-20 (1993).
8. Id. at 609.
9. See LADD & UPSET, supra note 3.
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altogether a good thing. There are considerations that properly
lead us to censor ourselves. We may not want to give unneces-
sary offense to our students who, we suspect, may be offended by
our views or who may, if they know our views on disputed issues,
mute their expression to remain in good favor. We may not
want to introduce more discord into collegial relations than
necessary. Yet, when a general uniformity of opinion on
important issues prevails, and particularly when this uniform
opinion tends to be held with some intensity, the silencing effect
of self-censorship can have negative effects. Self-censorship can
deceive our students and our colleagues into thinking that their
fellow-citizens are totally misguided, or subjected to false
consciousness by powerful media and political interests, and for
this reason may not take seriously the possibility that they may be
wrong. The fact that the few Harvard faculty members who were
for Ronald Reagan did not speak up (two did, and identified
themselves with his campaign, but that is an indication of how
many did not) undoubtedly contributed to the general astonish-
ment in Cambridge that he was elected-as one commonly
heard, "I do not know anyone who voted for him."
The effects of self-censorship on students and their views of
the world can be more serious. In the late 1970s, because I had
written a book critical of affirmative action,"° I was often asked
to participate in discussions of affirmative action. There seemed
to be no shortage of advocates on one side of this issue, and
often those advocates were employees of the university responsi-
ble for implementing affirmative action. Generally, no one but
I spoke in criticism of certain affirmative action policies, and I
had to choose a number of times between taking the unpopular
position once again on an issue on which I had already written
and spoken, or resigning myself to the possibility that no one
else would present the arguments against affirmative action.
This could only contribute to a distorted view of popular
opinion on this matter among minority students, and I believe
they did have such a distorted view since they may never have
heard anyone speak against affirmative action. Because they had
not heard any arguments against it, they considered opposition
an extreme or extremist position held only by racists and kooks.
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This conclusion only encouraged them to express their strong
support of affirmative action, which one would think inhibited
their classmates from expressing their doubts, whether these
were mild or strong. As a teacher, when one knows a position
will surprise, offend or even outrage students, one hesitates to
express it. And this hesitation is particularly true when the
position affects one group of students especially because of race,
gender, or sexual orientation. "In your face" expression may be
the way in talk shows, but it is not the way in teaching or in
public discussion where one hopes to have some effect on those
who hold other views.
I found it easier to make the case against affirmative action
in a student meeting than in a class, and I have often wondered
why. For one thing, the mere fact that the public meeting was
announced as one dealing with this subject freed one-indeed
required one-to present one's views. In a classroom, the
controversial issue might be only one of a number of topics that
could be raised in connection with the subject of the course, and
there might be a gratuitous factor, depending on the state of the
issue at the time, in raising it. For another, in the public
meeting one spoke to an audience of people one had not seen
before, and would not see again, while in a classroom one knew
one would have to live with the students all term; therefore one
tried to find formulations that would lessen the tension. This
position should be distinguished from cowardice, though, of
course, there can be simple cowardice in not raising difficult
issues and it could be justified by arguing, as Glenn Loury does,
that in certain contexts the flat assertion of views and positions
does not educate or inform, but only creates tension and
conflict. This argument would notjustify lying about one's views
or avoiding topics, but would suggest that the manner in which
issues are raised and views presented could well be modified.
Individuals vary greatly in their tolerance for tension and
conflict. Some teachers seem to revel in it, and, on occasion, I
think the straightforward approach they take is better than mine.
These concerns also led me on occasion to wonder whether
I should not also refrain from mentioning certain facts. In the
debates at the time over affirmative action, the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the Bakke" case often came up. In Justice
11. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Powell's opinion, he refers to the relative standing of medical
college admission tests for the plaintiff, Bakke, who had been
rejected by the medical school of the University of California at
Davis, and of the minority students who had been admitted
under the school's affirmative action program. 2 Bakke's scores
were in the ninetieth percentile while the special minority
students admitted had scores in the thirtieth and fortieth
percentile.'
Presenting these facts at one meeting, I recall an audible
gasp from a largely minority audience. Presumably, there are
those who would be pleased at producing such an effect. I was
not. This disparity was so shocking that in subsequent meetings
I was tempted to shy away from it. Was I concealing important
information from the students? One could say that. There was
also such a thing as a blow to their self-esteem, insofar as they
saw themselves as standing for their group, and the consequenc-
es of this might not be positive. Perhaps the effect of the shock
would lead to further discussion which could be fruitful, such as:
how effective are the tests?, are there alternatives?, is this the way
future physicians should be selected?, et cetera. At some point
in such discussions, if one believes in the good will of those with
whom one is engaged in discussion, one tries to find some
common ground (this is another way in which classes and serious
campus discussions are different from talk shows). I often
wonder whether I tried to find this common ground too early,
from the point of view of either good education or good group
relations. I suspect I did. And yet at the time I was the most
outspoken person on campus-indeed the only outspoken
person--on this issue. Whatever the defects of my approach, it
was the only one available at the time.
I could pursue this theme of self-censorship with further
personal examples, but I would now like to broaden it to
consider the larger question of its relationship to academic
freedom. Clearly, my academic freedom was in no way inhibited
nor was I punished in any way. Probably some students chose
not to enroll in my classes because of my views. I have heard
that. One faculty member reported to another her discomfort
at continuing to teach a course with me, which may have been
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because of my views. I suspect that there were certain faculty
committees dealing with race and minority issues on which I was
not placed, despite my interest in and knowledge of these issues,
because my views were considered too extreme; administrators
might well have been concerned that this would lead to a degree
of disharmony in the group. But the more interesting issue is:
why were there so few speaking on these issues, and to what
extent were the faculty censoring their views? I think this self-
censorship was widespread and common. In many cases, there
was the excuse, "It's not my field." It is also true that these
issues directly impinged on academic matters, and faculty had to,
in one way or another, take a stand.
We do not know how much such self-censorship has
occurred, but I believe there has been a good deal. Since we
have no survey of the scale of those studies that Paul Lazarsfeld
and Wagner Thielens conducted in the 1950s, 4 we have no way
of estimating how widespread it is. I am not speaking about self-
censorship in expressing prejudice. If such expressions have
been inhibited by self-censorship because of concern for one's
colleagues, then one would think that such censorship is for the
good. I am speaking of reasoned opinion held on the basis of
consideration of the known facts. When such opinion is
censored, it cannot be for the health of the university and
college.
In recent years, for example, there has been a persistent
issue raised at Harvard about the university's ROTC program.
The faculty insisted on withdrawing from the program during
the Vietnam years, but in later years it was resuscitated in a
minimal form. Harvard students could enroll in the program,
but they would have to take their training at MIT, to which
Harvard paid a fee for this purpose. In recent years, gay and
lesbian faculty members have led an assault on the ROTC
program charging discrimination against gays and lesbians. A
committee was set up to review the matter. It proposed in a
report that if the "discriminatory" armed services policy persist-
ed, Harvard should sever all relations with ROTC, and that it
should go so far as to prevent Harvard's ROTC students, who
were graduating and becoming officers, from receiving their
commissions at a ceremony on campus. It goes without saying
14. See LAzARsFELD & THIELENS, supra note 2.
1996]
9
et al.: Academic Freedom in the 1990s
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996
W!LLAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
that such a committee would have gay and lesbian representa-
tion, but I do not believe anyone was appointed who was known
to have a position in favor of the ROTC affiliation. There was
some uneasiness in the faculty at accepting the committee's
report. In fact, a substantial minority voted against the proposal
to ban the commissioning of graduating student officers on
university property. Only one faculty member, Harvey Mansfield,
made a lengthy and reasoned presentation in opposition to the
report, and two others spoke against parts of the report. Where
were the others?, one wondered. One can ask the same question
of the faculty in many other disputed areas.
A final issue of self-censorship: Withdrawing from the
teaching of a course on a topic on which one is a specialist
because one has been criticized by members of a minority group
on grounds of tone or content. There are two cases of this sort
discussed in D'Souza's Illiberal Education, that of Stephen Thern-
strom at Harvard, and of Reynolds Farley at the University of
Michigan.15 I am not sure all of D'Souza's facts or inferences
are correct in his brief statement of these two cases, so I refer to
them as examples of a problem, rather than to take any position
on the actions the two faculty members took. In both cases,
distinguished scholars who came under attack decided not to
continue teaching the course for which they were attacked. In
both cases the withdrawal from teaching the course was appar-
ently voluntary.
One assumes there have been other such cases, and
probably many more of faculty who do not teach a course
because they expect there might be problems raised by students
who object to their point of view. This is possibly the most
serious example of how self-censorship in response to the
present wave of zealotry affects the climate on the campus. It
restricts what is said and written and taught, not because of the
direct sanctions that might be imposed, but because the climate
of opinion means one must be engaged in controversy, with its
costs in time, in social relationships, and in career opportunities.
But it is not easy to know how to deal with this problem.
However we buttress the protection of academic freedom, when
people feel passionately about certain matters there will be costs
to taking an opposite position. At the least we should insist that
15. D'SOUZA, supra note 4, at 148-51, 194-97.
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these costs not be imposed by administrative or other formal
action. And when we take the unpopular position, we should be
ready to risk and endure the discomfort that may come as a
consequence. Fortunately they are more modest today, for the
most part, than ever before.
11
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